Swine Health Information Center

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CENTER FOR ANIMAL HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Swine Disease Global Surveillance Report

Worldwide pork production is highly interconnected by trade between countries and markets which could increase the risk of introduction of foreign pathogens into the US.

PROJECT

The aim of these reports is to have a system for near real-time identification of hazards that will contribute to the mission of assessing risks to the industry and ultimately, facilitate early detection and identification, or prevent occurrence of events, in partnership with official agencies, and with our international network of collaborators.

Monthly reports are generated through a systematic process that involves screening various official data sources, including government and international organization websites, as well as softer sources such as blogs, newspapers, and unstructured electronic information from around the world. These data are then curated to create a raw repository.

Subsequently, a multi-criteria rubric is applied to evaluate each event. This rubric assesses factors like novelty and the potential direct and indirect financial impacts on the US market. The outcome of this rubric application is a final score assigned to each event.

These final scores, along with an epidemiological interpretation of the event's context, are published.

The interpretation encompasses details like the credibility of the information, the scale and speed of the outbreak, its connectedness to other factors, and the local capacity to respond.

These communications and the information contained therein are for general informational and educational purposes only and are not to be construed as recommending or advocating a specific course of action.

CENTER FOR ANIMAL HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

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Swine Disease Global Surveillance Report

Tuesday, December 2, 2025, to Monday, January 6, 2026

Report Highlights

- **Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Cyprus**: Authorities in the Turkish Cypriot-administrative area reported the first FMD case since 2008.
- **African Swine Fever in Spain**: Preliminary results of the investigation have not confirmed the link between the outbreaks and the research facility in Catalonia.
- **FMD in South Africa**: Authorities reported a substantial increase in FMD outbreaks, with 165 additional outbreaks in December 2025, bringing the total number of ongoing outbreaks to 583.
- **Pseudorabies in Hungary**: Authorities report to WOAH an outbreak at a commercial pig farm, marking the country's first case since eradication in 2021.

DECEMBER 2025 - OUTBREAKS BRIEF

R	Location	Report Date	Dx	Impact
2	Catalonia, Spain	12/15	ASF	29 positive wild boars total have been detected so far in the high-risk area
1	Cyprus (North)	12/15	FMD SAT 1	Multiple dairy farms affected - emergency vaccination of over 45,000 animals
1	Multiple provinces, South Africa	12/15	FMD SAT 2	165 new outbreaks
1	Hong Kong, China	12/17	ASF	Pig farm - 978 pigs affected
1	State of Piaui, Brazil	12/20	CSF	New outbreak in a backyard farm, 56 cases, outside the CSF free zone
1	Lebanon	12/30	FMD *Not confirmed*	53 outbreaks reported - over 3,000 small ruminants affected
1	Hungary	1/6	PRV	Outbreak in a commercial farm with >7,000 pigs

Outbreaks described in the table above are colored according to an assigned significance score. The score is based on the identified hazard and potential to affect the US swine industry. Rank (R) Blue: 1 - no change in status; Red: 2 - needs extra attention as the situation is dynamic; Black: 3 - requires consideration or change in practices to reduce exposure to the US swine industry.

African Swine Fever

EUROPE

In December (11/27/2025-12/31/2025), the number of ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs continued to decline. **Six European countries** (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia) reported a total of **45 outbreaks**, representing a 1.2-fold decrease compared to the previous month (n=54). Romania (n=21) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (n=13) reported the most outbreaks. The majority of outbreaks occurred in small-scale and backyard holdings.

Over the same period, ASF detections in wild boar rose substantially. Thus, 17 European countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Spain, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine) reported 1300 outbreaks, reflecting a 1.5-fold increase compared with the previous month (n=841). The highest numbers were reported by Poland (n=317), Bulgaria (n=291), Latvia (n=135), and Lithuania (n=128). Spain reported additional wild boar cases detected within the core zone, approximately 19 mi^2 (30 km^2).

The spatial distribution of ASF outbreaks across Europe between November 27 and December 31, 2025, is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The distribution of African swine fever outbreaks in Europe from November 27 to December 31, 2025 (in Blue: domestic pigs; in red: wild boar (Source: FAO EMPRES-i).

Regional Highlights:

- **Spain | December 15: New wild boar cases detected within a confined area under active surveillance and movement controls.** The ASF situation in Catalonia involves localized detections in wild boar within a mixed urban–forest environment. Initial cases were identified in a residential area of Cerdanyola del Vallès, where wild boar had access to food waste and dense vegetation, followed by additional carcasses at the same site and a second detection near the Autonomous University of Barcelona's campus, about 0.6 miles (1 km) away. Figure 2 presents the timeline of events.



Figure 2. Timeline of events in Catalonia since the first detection in late November

Authorities established a 12-mile (20-km) Infected Zone, with a 3.7-mile (6-km) core/high-risk area, restricted wild boar movements, and launched intensive active surveillance. Figure 3 illustrates the locations of outbreaks and the zoning measures applied.



*"new ASF positives" = new individual cases, while "ASF spotlights" = clusters or outbreak locations used for surveillance, reporting, and zoning decisions

Figure 3. Locations of confirmed and negative cases and the applied zoning measures in Catalonia, Spain, as of December 16, 2025 (Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food)

As of December 12, 2025, 126 wild boar carcasses had been recovered and tested, including 16 ASF-positive animals across seven outbreaks (two primary and five secondary), while 110 tested negative. The area is characterized by moderate wild boar density (four to five wild boar/0.4 mi²), urban–wildlife interface, and major roads limiting spread, with a low density of pig farms (55 commercial farms in total). No commercial pig farms have been affected, supporting the assessment that the outbreak remains contained to wildlife with no spillover into domestic pigs to date.

The outbreak has already had a significant impact on both the economy and labor. A slaughterhouse in Osona implemented temporary layoffs affecting 458 workers, marking the first employment action linked to the outbreak. Catalonia faces nearly $1.2 billion USD (€1 billion) in export risk and potential impacts on ~11,000 jobs, although regionalization has preserved most third-country trade, with only about one-third of Spain's exports fully suspended. Market confidence has weakened sharply, with falling pig and piglet prices and a rapid decline in pork values driven by surplus meat that is no longer exportable to Asian

markets. Farmers' unions estimate ASF-related losses at $28 million USD (€24 million) per week, considering the $12 million USD (€10 million) Catalan aid package insufficient.

The Catalan Government has decided to send to slaughter the finishing pigs located on farms within the disease-affected radius. The European Commission has expanded the affected area to 91 municipalities, increasing to 55 the number of holdings included in the control measures. The 16 additional farms incorporated as a result of this expansion are currently under analysis.

At the express recommendation of the European Commission, no depopulation will be carried out on the affected holdings. The total capacity of farms within the affected radius is 80,000 animals, but the current census stands at 61,500 animals. Of these, 35,600 are finishing pigs and will be sent to slaughter gradually.

Control measures in place:

- **Active surveillance:** Intensive, protocol-driven searches for wild boar carcasses to define and delimit the Infected Zone (IZ), using trained field teams, canine units, drones, and helicopter support; over 300×300 m grid inspections conducted between November 28-30, 2025.
- **Population containment:** Measures to isolate wild boar populations (fences, enclosures, olfactory/light/sound repellents); hunting and public access prohibited in core and high-risk zones; trapping reinforced in lower-risk areas to create a buffer.
- **Pig farm protection:** Movement bans on live animals and products; enhanced biosecurity and passive surveillance; all 55 commercial pig farms visited with no clinical signs detected to date; ongoing periodic inspections.
- **Enforcement and coordination:** Support from the Military Emergency Unit (UME), regional and national police, and local authorities, starting from December 1, 2025, to restrict access, disinfect vehicles, and secure affected areas, as well as collaboration with trained hunters.
- **Stakeholder engagement:** Regular meetings are held with regional authorities, the pig and hunting sectors, and environmental agencies; coordination with transport authorities for motorway rest areas.
- **Awareness and training:** Ongoing public and sector-specific awareness campaigns (transporters, backyard farms, wildlife feeding risks); preparation of hunter training materials.
- **EU support:** EUVET expert mission (December 3-4, 2025), including stakeholder meetings, field visits to the IZ, and recommendations to national and regional authorities.

Sequencing and origin assessment

While sequencing on November 28th confirmed the Catalonia field strain as an ASFV genotype II, it also revealed novel genetic features that differentiate it from currently circulating strains in other European countries, prompting further investigation into its origin. The theory of a long-distance human-mediated introduction from the most affected Eastern European regions would no longer be a plausible direct explanation.

The strain exhibits similarities to the original strain detected during the first incursion in Georgia in 2007, while also carrying unique mutations and genomic changes not previously reported, indicating a distinct variant. Based on these findings, authorities are examining multiple potential pathways of introduction. Because the initial wild boar detection occurred near a research facility where ASFV work was ongoing, a laboratory-related hypothesis is being reviewed alongside alternative explanations.

On December 30th, the first results of the review committee were shared. While the results need to be considered preliminary evidence, the data analyzed so far (two sequences from the first two wild boar detected, plus 17 sequences from viruses that the IRTA-CReSA research lab has worked with in the last 12 months), work done by the Institute for Research in Biomedicine in Barcelona, do not allow confirmation that the ASF strain came from the laboratory. This field strain was also compared to 800 publicly available sequences, showing no match either.

No final conclusions have been reached, as authorities are still awaiting the independent results from the National Reference Laboratory in Madrid. Investigations continue under national oversight with EUVET laboratory experts involved, including document reviews, site visits, and independent audits to clarify the source.

The sequence detected in the ASF outbreak in Spain exhibits 27 point mutations as well as a significant deletion. This strain had not been previously described, so it has been assigned to a new group, 29. Within the research efforts to clarify the origin of the virus, the final determination will come from work being carried out at the Reference laboratory in Algete.

- **How do investigators trace the source of ASF genotype II outbreaks?**

Tracing the source of an ASF outbreak is not always straightforward, especially for genotype II, which is responsible for the outbreak in Spain and for most ASF outbreaks worldwide today. To understand the origin of the virus, investigators rely on a combination of field investigations, examining animal movements, human activities, biosecurity practices, and laboratory testing of the virus itself.

- **Why is it difficult to trace the origin of outbreaks?**

One of the main challenges is that genotype II ASF viruses, which have led to outbreaks in Europe, Asia, and the island of Hispaniola in the Americas, are often genetically very similar. When viruses are this similar, laboratory testing that examines only a single part of the virus genome is often

insufficient to distinguish these viruses or determine the origin of a particular outbreak. This was observed during the 2018 ASF outbreak in Belgium, where testing confirmed genotype II but was unable to clearly identify the source of the virus using basic genetic methods alone. Because of this limitation, there has been an increasing need for more detailed genetic tools that can better support outbreak investigations and help explain how the virus may have spread.

- **How are high-resolution genetic tools used?**

As whole-genome sequencing has become more accurate and accessible for many laboratories, researchers now study several regions of the virus's genome rather than relying on a single genetic marker. This multi-gene approach focuses on six regions of the virus that are known to show small but meaningful differences within genotype II. By analyzing these regions together, scientists can group closely related viruses into smaller genetic clusters. Using this approach, genotype II viruses have now been divided into 28 distinct clusters (potentially 29 pending confirmation of preliminary results from the laboratory in Catalonia), making it easier to distinguish similar strains.

At the same time, the European Union Reference Laboratory (EURL) maintains a specialized database that contains high-quality genetic information from genotype II ASF viruses collected during outbreaks in Europe and other affected regions. This database enables investigators to quickly compare new cases with previously detected viruses, supporting coordinated outbreak tracing efforts.

Together, the use of multi-gene analysis and the genotype II-specific database provides a strong and consistent system for understanding how ASF spreads within genotype II. When combined with on-the-ground field investigations, these tools enhance the ability to identify likely sources of infection and inform disease control and prevention efforts in affected regions.

International response

Import restrictions and enhanced certification

- Countries applying regionalization (partial bans/exceptions):
  - China and South Korea imposed limited suspensions on the outbreak area in Barcelona province, continuing imports from unaffected regions.
  - EU Member States applied internal zoning measures, restricting movements only around outbreak sites.
  - Argentina and the Dominican Republic allowed continued trade in products from non-affected areas, with Argentina permitting certain processed products (e.g., cured meats, salted casings) and the Dominican Republic requiring updated veterinary certification.
- Countries imposing full bans:
  - Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, and Taiwan fully closed their markets to Spanish products.
  - The Philippines also halted imports nationwide, indicating conditional acceptance of regionalization but requiring additional certification before resuming trade.
- Other actions:
  - The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) imposed additional controls on imports from Spain, particularly for animal feed ingredients and products from ASF-susceptible

species, with eligibility tied to pre-outbreak production dates and stricter documentation requirements.
    - The United Kingdom placed temporary restrictions or heightened monitoring.

Feed and by-product risk mitigation

- Canada, Japan, Taiwan, the UK, and Mexico have increased scrutiny of feed ingredients, raw materials, and by-products originating from Spain, recognizing feed as a potential pathway for ASF transmission.
- Additional permits, declarations, or heat-treatment requirements were applied in some markets (Canada, the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Argentina, EU).

Border and traveller controls

- Authorities (e.g., UK and EU partners) issued alerts to travelers from Spain, reminding them of the strict ban on bringing pork or pork products across borders.
- Reinforced messaging on penalties for illegal meat imports and disposal of food waste.

Surveillance and preparedness

- Neighboring and trading countries heightened surveillance in wild boar and domestic pigs, especially near borders and major transport corridors:
    - **France and Portugal:** Intensified wild boar surveillance and carcass searches near the Spanish border, with reinforced farm biosecurity checks in high-risk departments.
    - **Italy:** Increased monitoring of wild boar populations and transport controls, particularly in northern regions with strong trade and transport links to Spain.
    - **Germany:** Strengthened passive surveillance in wild boar and domestic pigs, with enhanced checks along major transport corridors and logistics hubs.
    - **Belgium and the Netherlands:** Raised alert levels for pig farms and slaughterhouses, emphasizing biosecurity audits and traceability due to their role as major pork trade and transit hubs.
    - **United Kingdom:** Placed veterinary services on heightened alert, reinforced border messaging to travelers, and increased awareness around illegal meat imports.
    - **Canada:** Enhanced import surveillance and risk assessment, particularly for animal products and feed ingredients originating from Europe.
    - Asian trading partners (e.g., **South Korea**, **Philippines**): Increased scrutiny of certification and origin, alongside reinforced domestic surveillance as part of preparedness measures.
- Veterinary services reviewed contingency plans, laboratory readiness, and reporting protocols.

Trade risk assessments

- Countries conducted rapid risk assessments to evaluate exposure via animal products, feed, and logistics, adjusting import policies accordingly while avoiding blanket bans when zoning criteria were met.

ASIA

In December, four regions, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Hong Kong, reported new outbreaks of ASF in domestic pigs.

Regional Highlights

- **India | December 3: Three new ASF outbreaks in the state of Assam.** These three new outbreaks bring the total of outbreaks in Assam to 400, with 18,000 pigs culled in the state this year. 2025 has been the most severe year for ASF in the state since 2020. On **December 19,** a district in Nagaland, which borders Assam, imposed an import ban on pigs and piglets and on the transport of pigs from outside the district until the ASF outbreak in Assam is contained. On **December 28,** ASF was confirmed in the state of Tripura; the affected village and surrounding areas have been designated as an infected zone, where all pigs will be destroyed.

- **Philippines | December 12: The province of Quezon has been declared ASF-free.** The control measures that led to this status included government-controlled vaccination programs, strict border inspections, and updated policies aimed at strengthening disease prevention and response.

- **Vietnam | December:** Between November 30 and December 30, 2025, 31 outbreaks in 18 provinces were reported by Vietnamese authorities to the FAO's EMPRES-i dashboard; each province had between one and six outbreaks reported. These reports are often batch-reported and may include outbreaks that occurred prior to the reporting period. One province, Gia Lai, has been struggling with a shortage of official veterinary personnel, partly due to government restructuring and downsizing, as well as low salaries for field veterinarians. Rural Western Gia Lai is home to many smallholder farming communities, where vaccination efforts and outbreak control and investigation are complicated. The lack of veterinarians employed in an official capacity increases the risk of livestock diseases not being properly controlled.

- **Hong Kong | December 17**: The Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department (AFCD) reported to WAHIS that samples taken from pigs on a licensed pig farm in Yuen Long tested positive for ASF. As of December 23, a total of 978 pigs from the index farm were culled, and the AFCD has implemented a series of preventive measures. No reports of abnormalities or positive testing have been reported near the original index farm.

Foot-and-Mouth Disease

EUROPE

Cyprus (north) | December 15: FMD confirmed in multiple livestock units, prompting emergency vaccination and cross-border containment. FMD was first recognized in mid-December after a sudden drop in milk production triggered investigations at a cattle unit in Ayios Sergios (Famagusta district), followed by laboratory confirmation by Ankara's Turkish Foot and Mouth Research Institute. Additional confirmed cases were reported on December 17–18 at a livestock unit in Lapithos, with further detections in Boğaziçi (İskele district). The virus was identified as the SAT1 serotype. Spread of this virus in a number of countries was considered 'highly likely' by FAO experts in their 4 December risk assessment. Map of Cyprus and location of outbreaks presented in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Map of Cyprus showing areas under Turkish and EU control; red rhombuses indicate the locations of confirmed outbreaks on December 16 (Source of the base map: By United States Central Intelligence Agency - CIA World Factbook: Cyprus)

Authorities imposed quarantines and movement bans, launched nationwide vaccination (over 35,700 animals vaccinated within six days; totals exceeding 45,000 by late December), implemented vehicle and facility disinfection, and established checkpoints in affected municipalities. Authorities in Northern Cyprus estimate that elimination can be achieved within three months through vaccination, but experience shows that success depends on high coverage and sustained monitoring. EU veterinary emergency experts arrived on December 19 to review measures; intensified biosecurity was enforced along the buffer/green line, including disinfection at crossing points and coordination with police, customs, UN forces, and British Bases.

Epidemiological Situation

- Cyprus has maintained FMD-free status since 2008, following an outbreak in 2007 caused by serotype O. The country discontinued vaccination in 1984, and prior to the 2007 event, FMD had not been recorded in Cyprus since 1964.
- The FMD SAT1 serotype, originating in sub-Saharan Africa, has exhibited atypical geographic expansion since its first detection in Iraq (March 2025), with confirmed spread to Azerbaijan, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Türkiye, as well as likely Iran, and suspected in Lebanon. Transmission is primarily linked to informal animal movements.
- First SAT1 serotype detection in Cyprus, with two confirmed outbreaks within one week, ~50 miles apart, suggesting multiple introductions or prior undetected circulation.
- Türkiye remains endemic for FMD, with serotypes A, O, SAT1, and SAT2 detected between 2023–2025, and has reported over 1,100 SAT1 outbreaks in 2025 alone. The SAT1 strain responsible for the Cyprus outbreak is assessed by UK DEFRA to have entered the island via Türkiye. When combined with documented trade flows to Cyprus (including cattle meat, raw cow milk, and whole-milk cheese; FAOSTAT 2023), intensive informal movements, and close geographic proximity, these factors substantially increase the likelihood of virus introduction via livestock or animal product movements.

- A sharp decline in milk production triggered testing, indicating infection may have been present for several days before diagnosis, consistent with the two to 14 day incubation period and potential subclinical shedding, especially in small ruminants.
- Cyprus's non-vaccinating status has resulted in an immunologically naïve livestock population, increasing the risk of rapid spread and severe clinical impact.

International reaction:

- Australia temporarily removed Cyprus from its FMD-free list, affecting halloumi exports, while EU veterinary emergency experts were deployed to assess the situation.
- Canada imposed import restrictions on live animals and animal products, requiring certification that affected commodities were collected or slaughtered before November 14, 2025.
- Saudi Arabia, a key regional trading partner, is considering a full embargo on halloumi imports and has notified Cypriot authorities, raising serious concerns among Cypriot cheesemakers.

Key Facts about Cyprus

- Cyprus is politically divided: the Republic of Cyprus (EU member) controls the south, while the northern part is under Turkish military control and recognized only by Türkiye.
- The Green Line separates the two areas. EU animal health law applies only in the south and is suspended in the north.
- Animal disease outbreaks in the north are not under EU veterinary control, creating a heightened biosecurity risk for the entire island.
- The Republic of Cyprus must demonstrate strict separation, surveillance, and biosecurity to retain its WOAH and EU disease-free status.
- Disease events in the north can still trigger trade reactions by third countries, as seen with temporary export restrictions, despite no cases in EU-controlled areas.
- Cyprus is a major exporter of dairy products (e.g., halloumi), making animal health status critical for international market access and consumer confidence.

ASIA & EURASIA

In December 2025, Lebanon, Türkiye, and Mongolia reported ongoing FMD epidemiological events. Lebanon experienced widespread multi-species outbreaks across three governorates. Türkiye continued to manage extensive SAT1 and untyped outbreaks with quarantine and vaccination measures. Mongolia reported a limited serotype O outbreak in domestic sheep, with surveillance and vaccination underway to prevent further spread.

Regional Highlights

- **Lebanon | December 30: FMD outbreaks have been reported in three governorates.** Lebanon notified WOAH of 53 ongoing FMD outbreaks in the governorates of Baalbek–Hermel, Akkar, and Bekaa. The outbreaks have affected domestic cattle, sheep, and goats. Among mixed sheep and goat herds, 1,894 cases and 41 deaths were reported, with 3,251 animals classified as susceptible. In domestic cattle, 2,734 cases and 51 deaths were recorded, with 7,391 susceptible animals. The first outbreaks were detected on November 20, and 11 new outbreaks were reported on December 16, bringing the total to 53 ongoing outbreaks. The suspected source of infection is animal movement, with further spread occurring through direct contact at shared grazing and watering points. The FMD virus serotype has not yet been confirmed. Vaccination campaigns have been initiated in the affected areas, with approximately 5,000 cattle vaccinated to date. Lebanon last reported FMD outbreaks in 2009, which were attributed to serotype A and untyped strains.

- **Türkiye | December 08: FMD continues to spread in Türkiye.** Outbreaks reported in November prompted quarantine measures in 11 neighbourhoods of the Milas district in Muğla Province. Authorities report that 12,763 animals have been vaccinated in the affected area, alongside intensified biosecurity and disinfection measures. Livestock owners have also been sensitized to preventive practices and the importance of vaccination. In total, 1,144 SAT1 outbreaks and 202 untyped outbreaks have been reported in 2025.

- **Mongolia | December 18: FMD outbreak reported in domestic sheep.** An outbreak of FMD caused by serotype O was reported on a sheep farm in Sühbaatar Province, where four cases were detected among 563 susceptible sheep. The source of the outbreak remains unknown. Active screening of sheep and goats has been conducted in selected animals (administrative division), leading to the identification of additional cases. As a control measure, vaccination has been planned for a total of 3,195 sheep and goats in the affected and suspected areas.

AFRICA

In December 2025, Eswatini and South Africa reported significant FMD events driven by SAT serotypes. Eswatini experienced a sharp rise in SAT1 outbreaks across multiple regions, while SAT2 outbreaks remained stable. South Africa reported SAT2 outbreaks across five provinces and announced a mass vaccination campaign and regulatory updates to support outbreak control and recovery.

Regional Highlights:

- **Eswatini | December 23: Surge in SAT1 FMD outbreaks across multiple regions.** Eswatini reported a marked increase in FMD outbreaks caused by SAT1, affecting the Lubombo, Manzini, and Hhohho regions. Between late November and December 2025, 30 new SAT1 outbreaks were reported to WOAH, bringing the total to 48 ongoing SAT1 outbreaks. These outbreaks resulted in 228 new cases among 456 susceptible domestic cattle, with an additional 386 cattle vaccinated during the reporting period. By the end of 2025, cumulative SAT1 figures reached 7,428 cases among 65,530 susceptible cattle, with 35,250 cattle vaccinated overall. In contrast, SAT2 outbreaks remained stable, with 29 unresolved outbreaks; two outbreaks were resolved in December, one in Lubombo and another in Shiselweni, and no new SAT2 cases were reported during the month. Despite ongoing challenges, the Ministry of Agriculture authorized limited livestock trade for slaughter during the festive season, restricted strictly to within FMD-affected areas to mitigate further spread.

- **South Africa | December 15: Sustained FMD SAT2 transmission in five Provinces.** South Africa reported a substantial increase in FMD outbreaks linked to the serotype SAT2, with authorities updating 165 additional outbreaks in December. This update includes both new outbreaks detected in December and previously unreported outbreaks from October and November, bringing the total number of ongoing outbreaks to 583. During this period, 6,344 new cases were reported in domestic cattle, alongside 61,440 newly classified susceptible cattle. Ongoing SAT2 circulation continues to drive outbreaks across multiple provinces, particularly KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), Mpumalanga, Free State, North West, and Gauteng.

  Vaccination strategy update. South Africa has announced a mass FMD vaccination campaign in response to the ongoing outbreak situation, with the first vaccine batch expected by mid-February 2026. Vaccine supply is being expanded through the Botswana Vaccine Institute, which is increasing production to meet the elevated national demand. Meanwhile, additional suppliers are being engaged to ensure they meet the desired quality standards for vaccines. The government is also seeking to approve a manufacturer for an oil-based vaccine. A risk-based vaccination strategy has been adopted to ensure the efficient and scientifically targeted deployment of vaccines, beginning in priority areas. Vaccine requirement estimates are being refined through coordinated data collection from breed societies, dairy and feedlot sectors, and communal area censuses. Alongside vaccination, authorities are strengthening diagnostic capacity by evaluating regional, provincial, and private laboratories to support serological testing, thereby addressing delays in laboratory turnaround times that are critical for both active and post-vaccination surveillance. Concurrently, protocols and regulations, originally designed for an FMD-free system without vaccination, are being revised to reflect the policy shift, with updates underway for traceability, biosecurity, compartmentalization, and trade and health schemes across key livestock sectors.

References:

Recurrent reports reviewed
WOAH - WAHIS interface - Immediate notifications
WOAH - WOAH Asia Regional Office
FAO - ASF situation update in Asia & Pacific
DEFRA - Animal conditions international monitoring reports
CAHSS - CEZD Weekly Intelligence Report
European Commission - ADIS disease overview

Rapid risk assessment: foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus serotype SAT1
EUROPE
Cyprus
Cyprus steps up foot-and-mouth disease controls at crossing points
Cyprus in state of emergency as foot-and-mouth outbreak in occupied north threatens livestock sector
Foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in Northern Cyprus
Foot and mouth disease outbreaks confirmed in Northern Cyprus; first detection of SAT1; no cases in government-controlled areas
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in the Middle East and Cyprus #4
Spain
African Swine Fever in wild boars in Spain
ASF in Spain: number of infected wild boars rises to 27 as investigation into virus origin continues
The Bellaterra laboratory was experimenting with the African swine fever virus when the first infected wild boar appeared
ASIA
India
Three new outbreaks in Assam
ASF in Tripura
Nagaland district imposes import ban due to Assam outbreak
Hong Kong
WAHIS
Press Release

Philippines
[Quezon regains ASF free status]
[Pig prices decline as Antique recovers from ASF]
Vietnam
[Shortage of veterinary services worries farmers]

AMERICAS
Canada
[Import restrictions in place due to FMD identified in Cyprus]
ASF - African swine fever
CSF - Classical swine fever
FMD - Foot-and-mouth disease
PRRS - Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
SVV - Seneca Valley Virus

[2024 CANADIAN INVASIVE WILD PIG REPORT]
USA
Argentina/Chile
[Wild Boar pose a threat to forest regeneration in Patagonia]

Abbreviations:

CCHF - Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
PPV - Porcine parvoviral infection
WOAH - The World Organisation for Animal
EFSA - The European Food Safety Authority
PDCoV - Porcine Deltacoronavirus

The GSDMR team compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Local governments, and international sources (WOAH, FAO, DEFRA, EC, etc.), as well as peer-reviewed scientific articles. The team makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, the accuracy, completeness, or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on maps and graphics do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the GSDMR team concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory, or sea area or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
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